Hirohito's over 60 years rein of Japan in the past century covers the two subjects that keep knocking my mind: war and piece, postwar economic miracle.
Is the emperor responsible for the war? Despite Chief Prosecutor Keenan's pronouncement that the emperor will not be called before the court and his demise in 1989, this question worths digging in because it provides one of the most important, if not the most important of the perspective of Japan as a state and a nation, more specifically the relationship between the emperor and Japanese people.
The question can be explored in two sub-questions: the emperor's ability to affect the war and peace decision and his intention on that.
After 1945 surrender, the emperor himself and conservatists claimed repeatedly that the emperor as a constitutional monarchy is totally groundless and politically driven. The Meiji Constitution established a dual system where the elected cabinet holds the authority over domestic affairs while the ultimate military decision resides with the emperor and the emperor only. Further, May 15 Incident (1932) in which the then prime minister was ssisinated by military terrorism abolished the party politics and established the emperor's overall absolute power at least superficially. However this can work both way. In the September 18 incident, the emperor failed to punish the military who staged such a serious incident without his knowledge, which made the emperor worry whether he would be taken seriously by the military thereafter. This concern could be strengthened after the military took a further step to abolish the party government. Even though it could be partially true, the emperor admitted that "If I had gone against the advocates of war, the public would no doubt have thought that we were surrendering to US when our army and navy had superior forces and a coup would have been staged. " This linked the second question: his intention on war and peace decision and the motives behind that.
The emperor was not strenuously opposed the war or even for the war with China as in his eyes there was little chance that Japan could lose, in which case his throne and emperor system could be threatened. His focus was more on strengthening his absolute power as a living God and ensuring that the ever growing military power in Japan was not out of control. This was exactly why he was annoyed after the September 18 incident. Thus, it will be more interesting to look the emperor's complicated intention at some critical moments during the war against US and England which the emperor believed that there was only 50 % chance to win if not lower. The emperor endorsed the war in a situation which he thought not going to war would 100% lead to an overall defeat. The oil embargo quickly deteriorated the national economy which was by then already half dried up by the war with Asian countries and not too long the warships and planes that Japan long took pride in would become rubbish without oil supply. On the other hand, he was afraid his opposition could trigger a coup with the "fight until death" emotion prevailed across the country. In both situations, his throne would be in trouble. So why not give it a try? The emperor was trying the luck for his selfish purpose by pushing the entire nation into the hell. Like all autarchy in the long history of human beings, the emperor valued his destiny more than the lives of hundreds of thousands of Japanese people. In the desperate stage of the war, the emperor apparently openly encourages anything that could give US a blow in order to negotiate a peace including suicide attacks. To avoid a surrender, the emperor was even willing to give southern akhalin and Manchuria to the Soviet Union in exchange for supplying Japan with oil. When the time came that the only way out was surrender, the emperor's top priority was still how to defend the emperor system.
Shockingly, after the noble decision to surrender, no hatred was found in oridnary Japanese who sacrifice everything for the emperor. An old man cried out in despair "This is stupid. If the war could be stopped by the emperor simply raising his hands and surrendering, why didn't he end the war sooner for us?" The logic behind is we Japanese are ready for death for you but your noble decision makes all the sacrifice made meaningless.
It was completely increditable that Japanese peole stayed irrelvelant when the big secret was released that their emperor handed over Okinawa to US in exchange for his name being excluded from the Tokyo war crime trial.
The support for the emperor could fall a little bit during the high inflation and extreme shortage of food period right after the war with the lefist and communist gained remarkable popularity among the starving Japanese. However, the emperor quickly regained his popularity by conducting the country tour, meeting people who never believe their living god would be in places like a mine. However, the tour was initiated by GHQ and the purpose was to take advantage of the emperor's impact to smooth their occupation. As a reward, the GHQ agreed that the emperor system be retained.
All were nothing but deals. The emperor successfully saved himself from the hang stage by riding on people's will (people's support to him as the emperor) as a shield. Now we know "100 million people repenting together" is just one out of a package o strategies of defending the emperor system. The emperor should also thank God for the Cold War coming at the right time which made he and his loyal people more valuable to US occupiers.
My feeling about Japanese people's loyalty to the emperor is a complex. I do not deny sometimes I am even moved by amazing stories like Onoda's return from jungle almost 20 years after the surrender. He refused to put down guns unless he got the command from this superior. He kept fighting as a one-man Japanese army. That question that haunted China and other Asian nations was whether this kind of absoluate loyalty and power might be revived which could potentially pull the region into another war disaster.
The answer from younger generations give us some relief. When asked why they signed up the memorial register at the imperial palace when the emperor lay ill, they replied " I might by chance appear on TV". Further asked if the emperor system is necessary, the answer was somewhat brilliant "It's not necessary to get rid of it."
Conclusion. The emperor was responsible for the war as he got the enough if not absolute power over the war/peace decision and his intention to go to war for the selfish purpose of defending the emperor system. Hence, the emperor should not only be punished by the international community but also be overthrown by Japanese people. Just as the UK paper put it after his death, "there is a place reserved for him in the hell."
The author of "The Age of Hirohito" claimed that "The greatest paradox of Showa political history resides in the fact that the emperor who had the absolute support of the Japanese people did not use people’s power. Instead, he as manipulated by a small group of militarist and bureaucrats all the while." The author actually shares the same base as mine that assuming the emperor firmly believed that in no event he would be overthrown, it would be more likely that he embraced peace. The point here is not whether the emperor had the absolute support or not but whether the emperor believed so or not. Apparently and unfortunately, the emperor was in constant fear that he could be overthrown. I would say that this fear which resided with every and one emperor in any autarchies is one of the fundemental driver of most wars and other disasters in human history.
